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In keeping with the overt symbolism that marked political monuments in Suharto's 
New Order, the Department of the Interior on Jakarta's main square was ornamented 
with a giant kentongan. A kentongan is an instrument made from a hollowed branch that 
is struck to give off a sound. Kentongan have been used by neighborhood watches 
(rondo) in Java's towns and villages for centuries as devices to keep thieves away, to 
call forth populations for territorial defense, and to keep people alert and ready to 
ward off threats to community well-being.1 Hung by a mosque, in a guard house, or in 
front of the village head's house, it is the quintessential technology for community 
policing. The kentongan at the Department of the Interior, by virtue of its size and 
location, would seem to represent a departure from the strictly local connotations of 
village kentongan. This grand kentongan was undoubtedly meant to provide the many 
thousands of kentongan in the nation's villages and towns with a new center with 
which to resonate. Through a sort of crude symbolism, the installation of this kentongan 
signified the subordination of local security apparatuses to the overarching security 
framework provided by the state.
The buildings that comprise the Department of the Interior are themselves 
representative of what is a characteristically New Order architectural style: large
1 On the various functions and meanings of the kentongan and the ronda, see Joshua Barker, "Surveillance 
and Territoriality in Bandung" in Figures of Criminality in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Colonial Vietnam, ed. 
Vicente L. Rafael (Ithaca: Cornell Southeast Asia Program, 1999).
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buildings which appear top-heavy since their upper floors, supported by long concrete 
columns, extend out beyond the lower ones. Such a style—most commonly seen in the 
thousands of banks that sprang up in all of Indonesia's towns and cities during the 
boom periods of recent decades—emphasizes two features of the building: the 
entrance way and the upper floors. The entrance way can be of monumental 
proportions, with a ceiling several stories high, giving the visitor a distinct feeling of 
being very small. The upper floors, in contrast, allow their inhabitants to sit atop the 
structure and survey the scene below, often from behind a wall of one-way glass. On 
the occasions that I was forced to visit the Department of Interior between 1995 and 
1997 (to report my research plans to the Socio-Political affairs bureau), I could not help 
but notice that the coupling of this architecture of surveillance with the kentongan did 
not quite work. Although the kentongan was given monumental proportions and 
carved with intricate designs so as to make it stand out to those who beheld it, it was 
clearly added after the building was constructed, for it had been pushed off behind a 
column so as not to get in the way. Without a spot of its own, it simply hung there, 
looking uneasy and out of place.
* * *
This paper will examine the New Order state's attempts to appropriate local, 
territorial power and to give it a place within the confines of the state.2 Specifically, it 
will focus on the effects of two initiatives pursued by the New Order state to use 
surveillance to eliminate and discipline representatives of territorial power: Petrus and 
Siskamling. Petrus is the acronym given to an early-1980s paramilitary operation 
known as the Mysterious Killings3 (Pembunuhan Misterius) in which thousands of 
people labeled criminals were murdered in a number of Indonesia's main cities. 
Siskamling, or sistem keamanan lingkungan (environment security system), is a term that 
was first coined by the head of the Indonesian police in the early-1980s to describe a 
new way of organizing the local security apparatus so as to give police the 
responsibility for coordinating and supervising neighborhood ronda, and for training 
and supervising private security guards (satpam) for use in commercial and public 
settings.4 Both of these initiatives were means of dealing with fears regarding a wave 
of violent crime that peaked in the early-1980s. At a policy level, the two initiatives 
moved in two different directions since one implied the eradication of the criminal 
element through what the government referred to as "shock therapy," while the other
2 In this paper, territorial forms of power are represented by the kentongan, the ronda, the tattoo, and 
figures like the jawara and preman. For an account of how territorial power is constructed by the ronda and 
the kentongan, see Joshua Barker, "Surveillance and Territoriality in Bandung."
3 Also meaning Mysterious Shootings (Penembakan Misterius) or Mysterious Shooters (Penembak Misterius).
4 Among the police it is also frequently called the sistem swakarsa. The Police have defined it as: "Unity and 
sameness of people's understanding, attitude, behavior within various living environments that arise in 
the shape of care toward preventing, prohibiting, tackling, and responding in an appropriate and speedy 
way to tendencies and/or cases of disturbance of order, crime, and calamities that could or are striking at 
their interests, themselves, or their surroundings, along with being able to take care of themselves in 
accordance with changing circumstances." Pusat Pengembangan Dmu dan Teknologi Kepolisian, Laporan 
Akhir Penelitian Industrial Security dm  Permasalahnya (Jakarta, 1994), p. 4.
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implied the development of a better system of law enforcement through an extension 
of the reach of the Police. According to Bourchier, officials in government were divided 
as to which strategy to pursue: some advocated the rule-of-law approach represented 
by Siskamling, others advocated the extra-judicial approach represented by Petrus.5 6In 
retrospect, however, it seems clear that the two solutions to the crime problem were 
effectively part of a single process. This process had as its object the 
/,deterritorialization,,6 of local security practices in a manner that was conducive to 
central state control. In the case of Siskamling, this was largely an institutional 
question which depended on subjecting gangs, security guards, and "criminals" to 
surveillance. But in the case of Petrus, it was a question of appropriating the power 
that "criminals" and gangs represented, a complex process that involved mimicry as 
well as surveillance.
This paper is based on a combination of textual sources and field research.7 It 
begins with a brief account of crime, security, and state power in the period 
immediately leading up to Petrus and the introduction of Siskamling. This is followed 
by a description of the changes to local security brought about by the implementation 
of Siskamling, changes that would only really get underway once Petrus had scared 
competitors away or killed them. The bulk of the paper is then spent analyzing Petrus 
itself: its lists, its ambivalence in defining the "criminal," and its attempts to recuperate 
the power that gangs and their leaders represented. Finally, the paper describes the 
legacy of Petrus and Siskamling for the relation between local security and state 
power.
Crime, Security, and State Power in the Early-1980s
The raging crime at the beginning of the 1980s, especially armed robbery 
directed at gold shop owners and bank clients, was a hot story in Bandung's 
media. The news was consumed by the people via the mass media so that it 
became a specter [momok] that caused the people fear. The criminals' actions were
5 David Bourchier, "Crime, Law and State Authority in Indonesia" in State and Civil Society in Indonesia, ed. 
Arief Budiman (Clayton, Victoria: Monash University, Asia Institute, 1990), p. 183.
6 For definitions of deterritorialization, see Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guatarri, A Thousand Plateaus. 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), especially pp. 61,141-144, 
453-456. My use of the term is somewhat analogous to Weber's use of the term "transpose" as in the 
following: "Bureaucratic and patriarchal structures are antagonistic in many ways, yet they have in 
common a most important peculiarity: permanence. In this respect they are both institutions of daily 
routine, , ,  The patriarch is the 'natural leader' of daily routine. And in this respect, the bureaucratic 
structure is only the counter-image of patriarchalism transposed into rationality. As a permanent structure 
with a system of rational rules, bureaucracy is fashioned to meet calculable and recurrent needs by means 
of a normal routine." S. N. Eisenstadt, ed., On Charisma and Institution Building (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1968), p. 18 (emphasis added).
7 Fieldnote citations are indented and signaled by the phrase [Fieldnotes] at the beginning of each section. 
The statements of informants were not recorded verbatim (unless in inverted commas) but were 
reconstructed shortly afterward from contemporaneous notes. Names of informants have been changed 
for obvious reasons.
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performed not just at night in fact but in broad daylight and in the middle of 
public crowds.8
The criminal specter came out of the shadow into the light of day at a particular 
time: the early-1980s.9 It appeared first in the mass media, then among the crowds, and 
soon after in Police theses like the one from which the above quotation is taken. There 
are several ways to explain why criminality appeared as a threat when it did. In the 
broadest terms, one could point to the fact that, in the history of the New Order, the 
early-1980s was a watershed period in both economic and political terms. 
Economically, 1973 to 1981 saw a tremendous oil boom which gave the state 
unprecedented revenues and leeway in pursuing policies of economic nationalism.10 
By 1982, however, the first signs of the oil bust began to appear, leaving the state in a 
weakened position with respect to foreign capital. As a result, 1982 and 1983 saw the 
introduction of liberalization policies, significant cuts in subsidies of energy and food, 
and a 27.6 percent devaluation of the currency.11 Politically, the regime was also 
beginning to show the possibility of fracture.12 Student demonstrations against the 
New Order in the late-1970s were followed in mid-1980 by the Petition of Fifty, in 
which many former supporters of Suharto expressed their opposition to the regime. 
Proponents of human rights and legal reform also managed to push through a new 
Code of Criminal Procedure which—on paper at least—curtailed some of the powers 
of the Police. In addition, beginning in 1979, a new, more professionally trained 
generation of military officers started to be appointed to command positions, a 
development that had the potential to undermine Suharto's monopolistic control over 
the military.13 Finally, enough time had passed since the killings of 1965 that the 
specter of a re-emergent PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) had begun to lose some of 
its currency: threats to public order were increasingly portrayed as being "purely 
criminal" rather than as being manifestations of underground "political" opposition. 
Against the backdrop of these wider developments, the criminal specter can be seen 
both as the symptom of a structurally weakened state (and society) and as a convenient 
excuse for actions aimed at trying to overcome this weakness.
8 W. P. Nainggolan, "Penggunaan Lokasi Pertokoan yang Dilaksanakan Oleh satpam dalam Rangka 
Menunjang Tugas Poltabes Bandung" (BA thesis, Jakarta: Perguruan Tinggi Dmu Kepolisian, 1984), p. 44.
9 On the way in which the solar eclipse of 1983 was used to justify the mysterious killings, see John 
Pemberton, On the Subject of "Java” (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), pp. 314-316. On the shadowy 
world of crime during the colonial period, see Henk Schulte Nordholt, "The Jago in the Shadow: Crime 
and 'Order' in the Colonial State in Java," Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs 2 5 :1 (Winter 1991): 
74-92.
10 According to Winters, 1981 saw the peak in availability of state discretionary funds. Jeffrey Winters, 
Power in Motion (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), p. 122.
11 Richard Robison, Indonesia: The Rise ofCaptital (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1986), pp. 125,382-384.
12 For a detailed account of tensions between members of the political elite and how they played 
themselves out in the Petrus campaign, see the excellent analysis by Bourchier, "Crime, Law and State 
Authority in Indonesia."
13 Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, rev. ed. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), p. 
357.
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When the specter of crime appeared, it took very particular forms: gali-gali and 
jawara (or jegger, jago, bromocorah, etc.).14 The former term, an acronym for "gangs of 
wild kids" (gabungan anak-anak liar), refers to organized gangs of people involved in 
criminal behavior, while the latter terms refer to professional criminals or charismatic 
toughs.15 Taken separately, there was nothing new about these fears and their objects. 
Jawara and their ilk had been a source of fear in Java for many generations, as 
numerous studies have demonstrated.16 Similarly, at least during the New Order, the 
existence of youth gangs in urban areas had periodically been a matter of concern.17 
With the rise in violent crime in the beginning of the 1980s,18 however, both jawara and 
gali-gali came under increasing scrutiny by the press and the government. Attracting 
particular concern were those jawara and gali-gali that were active in businesses or 
gangs providing "security services": debt collection, bodyguard rentals, security guard 
rentals, and the like. Such groups were thought to be taking crime into a new, 
organized, and supra-local realm. Both Siskamling and Petrus took these organizations 
as their object of attention.
Siskamling19
Siskamling was started in 1980 as an off-shoot of a larger government program 
called Kopkamtib (Komando Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban, or Command for 
the Restoration of Security and Order).20 It represented an attempt by the New Order 
government to impose overt state control over local security practices by taking them
14 In East Java they were known as bromocorah, in Sundanese as jegger. A  jegger is not so different from a 
jawara, except that the term has more criminal connotations. Bromocorah has closer connotations with black 
magic.
15 According to Siegel, contemporary newspaper accounts of Petrus portrayed gali-gali as having the 
following characteristics: they were excessively violent (sadis), they were organized, they took in a lot of 
money, they had an uncontrolled force of expression, and they desired what everyone else desired. James 
T. Siegel, A New Criminal Type in Jakarta. Counter-revolution Today (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998). 
For a description of preman, see Loren Ryter's article in this volume.
16 Onghokham, "The Inscrutable and the Paranoid: An Investigation into the Sources of the 
Brotodiningrat Affair" in Southeast Asian Transitions: Approaches Through Social History, ed. Ruth T. McVey 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), pp. 112-157; John Smail, "Bandung in the Early Revolution, 
1945-1946" (PhD dissertation, Cornell University, 1964); Sartono Kartodirdjo, Protest Movements in Rural 
Java: A Study in Agrarian Unrest in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1973); Schulte Nordholt, "The Jago in the Shadow"; Robert Cribb, Gangsters and Revolutionaries: The 
Jakarta People's Militia and the Indonesian Revolution 1945-1949 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1991).
17 For the most part, however, the Police regarded such gangs as a problem of juvenile deliquency and not 
as a serious threat.
18 For the statistical characteristics of this crime wave, see Bourchier, "Crime, Law, and State Authority in 
Indonesia."
19 Parts of this section have appeared in my "Surveillance and Territoriality in Bandung."
20 Kopkamtib was a structure of command initiated in 1965. Headed first by Suharto, and later by Sumitro 
and Sudomo, its aim was to "restore national security and order" by establishing a group within the 
military which had extraordinary powers and did not have to follow laws of criminal procedure. During 
the 1960s and 1970s, Kopkamtib was primarily used to eliminate, or at least frighten, "communists" and to 
suppress political dissent. Siskamling and Petrus marked a shift in Kopkamtib away from political threats 
to "crim inal" threats.
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out of the hands of organized private gangs. As the Chief of Police and founder of the 
program, Awaloedin Djamin, explained in his autobiography:
We definitely did not want to have the same thing happen in Indonesia that 
happened in other countries. In Japan, for example, the Yakuza forced protection 
on business people. Such a situation can give rise to excesses that are difficult to 
overcome. The same was true in the early days of the mafia in the United States.21
The Indonesian "security" groups Awaloedin was likely referring to were mainly 
of two types. The first groups were local, territorial gangs based in residential districts 
that had, over time, spread to adjacent bus terminals, markets, or shopping centers. In 
most major cities there were dozens of such gangs and turf wars were common. Many 
of these gangs were formed in the early days of the New Order and had been active in 
providing local "defense" in the context of the anti-communist pogroms.22 Some 
derived their authority from charismatic leadership, some from the fact that their 
members' parents were prominent officials in the government or military, and others 
from their successes in turf warfare 23 By the beginning of the 1980s, some of these 
local gangs had actually become quite large, and as their members grew older, had 
become rather professionally-minded in their provision of "protection" to local 
businesses.24 The second set of groups consisted of legal organizations rather than 
gangs. One of the most prominent of these was Pemuda Pancasila, the nation-wide 
youth group described elsewhere in this issue. Others included foundations and 
businesses formed by ex-convicts and others with few job possibilities. These groups— 
like Prems, Massa 33, and others—provided security services to shops, transport 
companies, wealthy business people, etc., by hiring out "guards" for the protection of 
particular locales, individuals, events, or traffic routes. Some of the larger groups, like 
Massa 33, claimed memberships of as many as fifty thousand people, almost all ex­
convicts and street-people 25
21 Awaloedin Djamin, Pengalaman Seorang Perwira Polri (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1995), p. 240.
22 In South Jakarta alone in 1970, the Police listed thirty-nine gangs. The names of some women's gangs: 
The Fu Man Chu, The Single Girl, The Pretty Doll, Monalisa, The Hunter Boys, Amigos. Regional gangs: 
Banten Boy, Batak Boy, AMS (Ambon-Maluku-Seram). ABRI (Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia) 
gangs: Gang Siliwangi, Gang Beerland, Gang Panser. Mixed gangs: Santana, The Trouble, SBC (Santa 
Barisan Setan), MBC (Manggarai Boy's Club), Sarlala (Sarang Laba Laba), Kasko (Kami Selalu Kompak), 
Kobel, Tjablak, Scarlet BCD, Motor Scarlet, Flamboyant, Devil Kids, The Casanova SK 700, Provost, 
Chabreek, 9 AK, Mr. Lonely Heart, The Bat Boy MDC, The Flaming Gos, Leo Patra, The Legos. In 
Bandung: Mexis, AMX, BBC (Buah Batu Boy's Club), Melos (Menak Lodaya Sadis), Megas (Menak 
Galunggung Sadis), Amek (Anak Muda Emong Karapitan), Hippies Dago, Dollar, Patorados, Bexis, TXC. 
See Soenarjo, "Suatu Analisa Tentang Tumbuhnya Gang Anak-Anak/Pemuda di Djakarta" (BA thesis, 
PTIK [Perguruan Tinggi Ilmu Kepolisian], 1970), pp. 59-63.
23 For a study of a jawara-based gang, see Ayip Muflich, "M ardy Pelingung Gang (Suatu studi kasus)," 
(BA thesis, Criminology Department, Universitas Indonesia, 1979).
24 See, for example, the study of Gang "X ", a gang which showed strong tendencies toward 
bureaucratization. See Leonard Tomasoa, "Kepemimpinan dalam Gang X (Suatu Studi terhadap 
Kehidupan di Gang di Dareah Kebayoran Bara)" (BA thesis, Criminology Department, Universitas 
Indonesia, 1981).
25 On Massa 33, see Farid Mappalahere, "Organisasi Massa 33 (studi kasus organisasi pengamanan swasta 
di Surabaya)" (Surabaya: Airlangga University, PLPIIS, 1981/1982); see also Surabaya Post, March 18,1995,
p .2 .
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For the Police, the growth of such private security services constituted a serious 
threat to their authority. Not only "protection" but even the pursuit, capture, and 
punishment of suspects was increasingly being entrusted to these groups rather than 
to the Police. Siskamling aimed to counteract this tendency by establishing clear 
controls over such non-state security businesses; it was hoped that Police control 
would prevent them from becoming mafia-like protection rackets (or at least that the 
Police would have a stake in these protection rackets). But Siskamling did not just 
target security businesses. In the domain of volunteer residential security as well, 
Siskamling aimed to establish a system for centralized monitoring and control, one of 
the aims of which was to discourage acts of communal violence against suspected 
thieves, sorcerers, and adulterers (and, undoubtedly, the Police themselves, as they 
were often targets of such violence). Moreover, Siskamling had purposes beyond just 
the monopolization of violence and the recuperation of "police" repressive powers. 
Both gangs and neighborhood watches were extremely effective tools for day-to-day 
surveillance of the population, and Siskamling provided a rubric for integrating them 
into the bureaucratic surveillance machine. In all these respects, then, Siskamling was 
viewed as a handy concept for increasing Police powers under conditions of an 
extremely low police to population ratio; and to do so at little or no added cost to the 
state.26
Siskamling's system of control worked by dividing local security guards into three 
types: satpam (Satuan Pengamanan, or Security Unit), Kamra (or "hansip"),27 and ronda 
(night guard). In general, satpam guards were responsible for protecting commercial 
and public buildings and spaces, while hansip and ronda guards were responsible for 
patrolling residential neighborhoods. Satpam and hansip were salaried and uniformed 
guards while the ronda, a far older institution, was still based on community obligation 
and used no uniforms. All three elements of the security system were brought under 
the control of the "Guidance of Society" (Bimbingan Masyarakat, or Bimmas) division of 
the Police.28 Because the guards were not paid by the Police, however, Bimmas's sole 
functions were surveillance and training. This new system, which was centered around 
the satpam, was explicitly meant to represent a departure from older forms of 
territorial security like the ronda and the jawara. As the head of Bimmas in Jakarta 
summed it up:
A satpam has two "heads"; the firm, house or office at which he or she is 
employed, and the police, from whom he—or she—gets training. . .
Being a satpam is a profession. A satpam is not a tukang ronda malant 
[voluntary neighborhood watch], nor are they centeng [thugs]. They don't just 
open the door for people . . .
26 In 1994, the ratios of the number of police agents to population in several countries were as follows: 
Hong Kong: 1:220; Thailand: 1:228; Malaysia: 1:249; Singapore: 1:295; New Zealand: 1:416; Japan: 1:563; 
Philippines: 1:665; Indonesia: 1:1,119. Asia Week, April 20,1994.
27 While technically called Kamra (Keamanan Rakyat, or Peoples' Defense), these guards are generally 
referred to as "hansip."
28 In addition to its work with Siskamling, Bimmas is also involved in training and working with youth 
groups.
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What satpam basically do is the police's job, that's why we train them and are 
responsible for them.29
The satpam was defined by what he or she was not: a thug, an old-fashioned voluntary 
ronda, or some kind of servant. Like the Police, he or she should be treated with 
respect, and should consider himself or herself to be a professional.
In the new system, Bimmas would ensure, in the first place, that all schools, 
neighborhood organizations, markets, businesses, and so forth had an individual or 
committee responsible for overseeing "security"; this would facilitate co-ordination 
between the Police and those who paid the guards' salaries. The Police would also, 
however, survey the guards themselves. As part of this surveillance, satpam and 
hansip guards were to be counted and classified according to the education and 
training they had received. There were to be three-month and one-month courses 
provided for satpam by the Police.30 Such courses would include training in military 
formation, marching, self-defense, and how to guard a vital industry, combined with 
some lessons on how to make reports to the police, how to keep track of the identities 
of those coming and going from offices, factories, or housing complexes, and what 
procedure to follow when one caught a suspect in a crime. Those who passed the basic 
training course would be allowed to possess knives; and those who went through a 
special screening process would be eligible to have guns. While the hansip did not 
have such a special training course, in principle its members were to join the satpam at 
the local police station each week for training. Moreover, all three types of guards—the 
ronda included—were to be "controlled" at their posts on a regular basis by patrolling 
members of Bimmas. On these more informal occasions, the police could make sure the 
guards were well-organized, gather information about threats for their intelligence 
reports, and give advice. Finally, to distinguish them from the public and from other 
security services, satpam and hansip guards were to wear standardized uniforms and 
carry identification issued by the Police. The satpam's uniform would consist of black 
pants and a smart white shirt with logos on the arms and a label on the front saying 
"satpam"; that of the hansip was comparable but all in an army green.
It was not just the guards themselves who were to be revamped. The security posts 
that used to be known as gardu or pos ronda were to become "pos kamling." They were 
now to be counted, inspected, and classified according to their facilities; it was to be 
noted, for example, what building type the pos had (i.e. from what materials it was 
constructed), and whether it had weapons, maps, flashlights, beds, and so forth. Based 
on this information, the Police could then work together with hansip and ronda guards 
to improve the facilities by making recommendations to the heads of RT's and RW's 
(Neighborhood Associations) about what had to be purchased (it was they who had to 
find a way to pay for improvements). Through a process of kentonganisasi, every pos 
kamling would be obliged to have a kentongan and a standardized code for warning of 
danger, as well as a list of who was responsible for guarding at what times. Ideally, pos 
kamling should also have handcuffs, weapons, and a phone, along with maps of the
29 Jakarta Post, October 13,1996. Centeng is translated by the journalist as "thugs" but in pre-Siskamling 
terminology it meant simply "night-watchman" (of warehouses, etc.).
30 In Bandung in 1996, more than half of the satpam guards working had attended these.
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area they patrolled, lists of important residents, lists of so-called residivis,31 and rules 
for the patrols.32 These visuals and lists would mimic those found at the local police 
station. Similarly, the pos keamanan (security post) that was usually to be found in the 
parking lot or lobby of commercial establishments was to be subject to the same sorts 
of monitoring and recommendations made to satpam employers if facilities were 
lacking.
In sum, if the program was a success, every locale—be it a neighborhood, a shop, a 
mall, a restaurant, a bus terminal, a government building, a parking lot, a school— 
would have at least one designated guard and an individual or committee responsible 
for working with the Police to supervise and organize both the watch and any other 
security measures. The guards themselves—through their training and use of Police 
modes of surveillance—would act as local representatives of Police authority.
The only real problem with this plan as it was introduced in the early-1980s was 
that people would not choose satpam and hansip over existing commercial security 
services. Not only did ex-convicts and gangs instill more fear in potential robbers and 
thieves, but they also instilled more fear in businesses and communities. In its earliest 
manifestation Siskamling thus tended to work not directly with the buyers of security 
services but with the sellers: those who controlled the gangs. Agreements were made 
with many of the emerging businesses run by ex-convicts and others, all of whom 
undoubtedly liked the idea of being legitimized by the state in return for submitting 
their members to training and guidance. For a brief period between 1980 and 1981, the 
Police, local government, and businesses created by gangs and ex-convicts thus 
enjoyed an openly co-operative arrangement that was probably economically 
beneficial for all involved. It was probably also politically beneficial to the ruling party, 
Golkar, which reportedly made use of these groups for strong-arm tactics in the run-up 
to the 1982 elections. The honeymoon was short-lived, however. In June 1982 the Chief 
of Police, under the banner of Kopkamtib, put out an order that effectively banned 
private security businesses.33 While it was legal to offer security consultation to 
businesses, to train prospective security guards, and to sell security devices, it was 
prohibited to rent out employees as guards. Furthermore, those businesses that 
continued to operate in the more restricted domain set out for them were subject to 
increased regulation. One regulation was that employees had to be able to provide a 
"Letter of Good Behavior,"34 meaning that no ex-convicts would be eligible to work in 
such firms; another forced firms to receive permission for their businesses from the 
provincial Police commander, and, if they intended to serve areas outside that 
command, from the national chief of police.
34 Residivis has a broader sense than the English word recidivist: it refers not just to "repeat-offenders" but 
often to "ex-convicts" as well.
32 Much of this mirrors the type of intelligence apparatus set up in East Timor. Compare, for example, the 
account found in Richard Tanter, "The Totalitarian Ambition: Intelligence Organisations in the Indonesian 
State" in State and Civil Society in Indonesia, ed. Arief Budiman (Clayton, Victoria: Monash University, Asia 
Institute, 1990), pp. 244-245.
33 Surat Keputusan Kapolri No. Pol. SK EP/220/V I/1982. June 14,1982.
34 The police-issued "Letter of Good Behavior" is a required document for almost any employment 
outside the informal sector (with the exception of foundations and businesses set-up for employing and
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As a result of this new policy, many of the newly-established private security firms 
shut down or were driven underground. Prems Surabaya, for example, which in 
February 1982 had met with members of the provincial congress (DPRD, Dewan 
Perwikilan Rakyat Daerah) and optimistically claimed that it anticipated a 
membership of fifty thousand people, about 60 percent of whom would be ex-convicts, 
officially broke up less than a month later.35 Prems Jakarta, on the other hand, restricted 
its official activities to providing legal aid and job-training to ex-convicts, while 
nonetheless continuing to offer illegal debt-collection services and security services.36 
In Bandung, where the first official security guards were known as Satpamsus (Satuan 
Pengamanan Khusus), the new policy had the effect of reducing the powers of the 
camat (head of the kecamatan, or sub-district). Initially, Satpamsus had been under the 
control of the camat and the heads of RT/RW, with some oversight from the Police and 
the Army. Under that system, the camat and RT/RW  officials had been the ones 
profiting from commercial security, since they collected money from shops and 
factories in their areas and hired out local toughs to keep security. With the new 
regulations, however, the camat and RT/RW  were restricted to involvement in 
residential security, while control over commercial security became the responsibility 
of an alliance between business owners and the Police.
Perhaps the most interesting case, however, was Massa 33, which had been started 
in the early-1970s by a gang of calo37 but had grown to be one of the largest of the ex­
convict organizations, with branches throughout East Java. It continued to operate 
illegally for a time, but was eventually the target of a Police operation. As a result of 
this operation (and with permission from the Army and Surabaya's mayor) the Police, 
working together with the head of the bus terminal, took down personal data on 
everyone, supposedly screened-out the hardened criminals, and arranged for some of 
the others to undergo training to become satpam. At Surabaya's bus terminal, where 
Massa 33 had been started, these reformed gang members were then mixed in with an 
equal number of non-Massa 33 satpam and all became employees of the terminal.38 In 
other words, Massa 33's organization was destroyed, but its reformable elements were 
integrated into a new organization based on the co-operation between the Police and 
the terminal head. To ensure that the gang did not survive as a force within this new 
organization, it was diluted with non-gang members. Furthermore, since the 
remaining members of the gang were considered to be employees of the terminal 
rather than members of an outside organization, they could be subjected to all sorts of 
governmental and firm-based controls.
In sum, the overall result of the government's policy was to deny gangs and 
private security firms their economic and legal bases, and to appropriate, and subject
reforming ex-convicts). This regulation thus closed off one of the few avenues ex-convicts had to regain 
the rights of ordinary citizens, condemning them to a life of economic—as well as social—exile.
35 Surabaya Post, February 22,1982, p. 2; Surabaya Post, March 8,1982, p. 2.
36 Teuku Ashikin Husein, "Jasa-Jasa Keamanan oleh Yayasan Prems di Wilayah Pertokoan Blok M " (BA 
thesis, PTEK, 1983).
37 Calo is a term meaning agent, broker or go-between. Calos at bus terminals approach customers to sell 
tickets and then demand a cut from bus drivers or bus companies.
38 One of the reasons ABRI was in favor of satpam was that it would provide an employment opportunity 
for low ranking retirees whose pensions were very small (and perhaps would keep them out of trouble).
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to Police surveillance, their "reformable" elements. This policy—in combination with 
the "systematization" and regulation of existing ronda practices—set the stage for a 
massive expansion of Siskamling into all domains of urban life, a process that would 
continue throughout the 1980s and 1990s.39 It also created a situation in which gangs 
that continued to operate were criminalized (with notable exceptions like Pemuda 
Pancasila), while those which disbanded were divided into clear groups of corrigibles 
and incorrigibles. In other words, it set the stage for Petrus.
Petrus
According to David Bourchier, who has analyzed the way the Petrus campaign 
unfolded, the killings of "criminals" began in earnest in March 1983 in the Central 
Javanese city of Yogyakarta and lasted for at least two years.40 During that time at least 
five thousand and perhaps more than ten thousand people deemed bromocorah, preman, 
or gali were killed. The killings were concentrated in the larger cities, like Jakarta, 
Surabaya, Bandung, Medan, and Semarang. Although the killings were condemned by 
international human rights groups, many press accounts were more or less approving 
of the government's methods for much of the campaign. While there were critics who 
complained that such extra-judicial punishments would undermine the rule of law, 
press interviews with people "on the street" almost invariably indicated a certain relief 
that "criminals" were being eliminated from city bus terminals, train stations, markets, 
and squares. (These sentiments seemed to have changed little fifteen years after the 
bulk of the killings took place).
Surveillance or Death: Lists, Operations, Tattoos
From the standpoint of its organization, Petrus was rooted in the tradition of 
surveillance. It depended first of all on a process of identification, which provided a 
representation of the "criminal" element in society, and secondly on an operasi that 
targeted particular people in the world "out there" based on the labels that had been 
attached to them. It was planned and organized centrally (most likely) by General 
Benny Murdani who then had control over the Armed Forces, Kopkamtib, and military 
intelligence; and it employed a discourse borrowed from hygiene operations, claiming
39 The non-gang guards that were hired were initially mostly low-level ABRI retirees, but as the program  
expanded the guards came to include young men and women, almost all of whom were either villagers or 
people who came from the poorer areas of towns.
40 Bourchier, "Crime, Law and State Authority in Indonesia," p. 185. In September 1982, before Petrus 
began, the family of a military commander in East Java had been murdered by thugs. The military's 
response to this was to avenge the killings by executing the suspects and throwing their corpses in a river. 
Nico Schulte-Nordholt, "Violence and the Anarchy of the New Order State" (unpublished). It is likely that 
this event and similar killings in the Jember-Bondowoso area some months before were the immediate 
models for the Petrus killings. See Bourchier, ibid, p. 185. One wonders, however, if these East Java 
commanders got their idea from a wave of killings they had handled in Jember in 1981. The victims of 
these killings, of which there were twenty-seven, were accused of being sorcerers and bromocorah, and 
were killed by the "m asses" from villages where they lived. They too were tied-up or placed in sacks and 
thrown into rivers. Surabaya Post, March 2,1981.
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to be aimed at "deansing" the nation's dties of the criminal "cancer" that threatened 
them .41 Bourchier describes the way the killings took place as follows:
Criminals, gang members, or ex-prisoners, frequently tattooed and almost 
always young and male, would be met in their houses or in the street by a group 
of four or five heavily built men. In many cases they would shoot their victim 
where they found him. More often the would bundle him (or them) into a jeep or 
Toyota Hardtop and drive off into the night. The victim would be taken to a quiet 
place and shot through die head and chest at close range with .45 or .38 caliber 
pistols. His corpse would then either be tossed into a river or left in some public 
place outside a cinema, a school or on a footpath of a busy street. Victims 
frequently had their hands bound, and often bore marks of torture. The following 
day there would be a short report about the finding of a "mayat bertato," (tattooed 
corpse) in the local paper, usually accompanied by grisly pictures.42
Bourchier goes on to note that there were also a number of mass graves to which large 
numbers of people were brought, killed, and their bodies dumped. This was done on a 
highly routinized basis: on every Friday and Sunday, for example. In the early part of 
the campaign, people living near the graves were permitted to witness these killings.
From this description of the killings, it is clear that they followed a pattern very 
similar to less violent operations which were such a prominent feature of New Order 
life: operations against becak, drugs, prostitution, vagrants, women's fertility (i.e. 
Family Planning), and the like. Just as in the operasi aimed at drugs, for example, the 
agents descended on their targets and removed them from the scene in order to 
maintain an image of order. The removal was then followed by the staging of a 
spectacle in which the targeted objects or people were shown to have truly been 
eliminated (the dead bodies displayed for all to see and the drugs crushed or 
burned).43 Furthermore, as with operasi like those conducted under the rubric of Family 
Planning, die solution Petrus posed for the criminal contagion was not just elimination 
but heightened surveillance. Bourchier's description of the mechanics of Petrus in 
Yogyakarta highlights these two objectives:
The procedure in Yogyakarta appears to have been that police intelligence 
supplied the garrison commander (Komandan Kodim) with a list naming 
hundreds of suspected criminals and ex-prisoners in the region. The garrison 
then put together a black list and issued a public ultimatum to all galis (without, 
however, naming names) to "surrender immediately" to the garrison 
headquarters. Those who did, and these numbered several hundred, were 
required to fill out detailed forms, providing their life history as well as data on 
all their family members and friends. They were also required to sign statements 
agreeing to refrain from criminal activities or face "firm  action" from the 
authorities. Each gali was obliged to carry a special card and report to the
41 Bourchier, "Crime, Law and State Authority in Indonesia," p. 184.
42 Ibid, p. 186.
43 Pemberton, describing the killings in Solo, notes that the Solonese morgue during this period, which 
was inundated with corpses, had a kind of open-door policy for people to come and look. Pemberton, On 
the Subject of “Java," p. 312. For a description of the logic of more mundane operasi, see my "Territoriality 
and Surveillance in Bandung."
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garrison on a regular basis. Those who did not turn up to be registered, or did 
not keep their appointments with the garrison, were hunted down and killed by 
squads of military men.44
In making its ultimatum to the public, the garrison was saying that it already had 
completed the process of identification and had a list of "criminals" in its possession. 
How were these criminals identified? Bourchier notes that the source of this list was 
the Police. The existence of such lists was, in fact, nothing new, since police and village 
heads have been compiling lists of so-called "butterflies," bromocorah, and residivis in 
their regions since the early part of the century.45 With the Petrus ultimatum, however, 
these lists took on a new significance. In the past, residivis subjected to heightened 
surveillance were clearly listed by local authorities and the rules of reporting laid out. 
There was no mystery about such lists and there was actually a fair amount of 
flexibility about who was listed since a person who behaved well in his community 
might well be left off the lists because of a local official's "oversight." Moreover, the 
lists themselves served a primarily administrative function, with the work of actual 
surveillance being carried out by the ronda and spies. This meant that a "butterfly" was 
kept aware of his status as a suspect by being subjected to repetitive monitoring by his 
peers. The Petrus ultimatum changed this state of affairs in three ways. In the first 
place, it said that the lists had already been compiled and so there would be no 
flexibility in the process of identification. Second, it made a point of keeping the 
contents of the lists secret. Third, it proposed an unprecedented equation: an 
unsurveilled "criminal" was equivalent to being dead. Each of these points will be 
discussed below.
In Indonesia, the idea that a government decision cannot be changed is usually 
greeted by cynicism accompanied by statements to die effect that in Indonesia 
anything is possible with money and influence. Indeed, one of the more common 
mantras recited by everyone from coolies to elite lawyers is that: "In Indonesia, 
everything can be bought." Yet when speaking of blacklists such an attitude is far less 
prevalent; even people who are otherwise unimpressed by state power show a certain 
anxiety and respect when die topic comes up. Consider, for example, Mr. Yanto, an 
older man living in Bandung who fitted very closely the definition of a Petrus target. 
As a youth he had been a member of street gangs, become known as a fighter, and later 
joined a group of armed robbers. Just after Petrus he completed a seventeen-year 
prison term for murder and armed robbery, and when I met him he was working as a 
bodyguard for an ethnic Chinese businessman. He was a gruff man and prone to 
sudden outbursts of anger, but he was also past middle-age, a bit weary, and not as 
good at hiding his kindness as he undoubtedly had been at one time. Nonetheless, he 
was always extremely self-confident and felt capable of manipulating all sorts of 
outcomes in his relations with the police, judges, and others. When I raised the topic of 
Petrus, it was he who mentioned the lists and became visibly frightened by the 
possibility that he might be on a post-Petrus blacklist. When I suggested that he might 
be able to pull some strings to make sure his name did not appear on such a list, he
44 Bourchier, "Crime, Law and State Authority," pp. 185-186.
45 For a description of list-taking practices at the start of the century, see my "The Tattoo and the 
Fingerprint: Crime and Security in an Indonesian City" (PhD dissertation, Cornell University, 1999), 
chapter 3.
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responded that it was impossible: "Once your name is on that list, it's done. You can't 
do anything about it."
That blacklists might be taken to be immutable—and could actually be so in many 
cases—shows that they are close to the heart of the state's power. At stake for the state 
in such lists is something far greater than the fate of the individual in question and 
greater even than the benefits derived from establishing interpersonal debts. It is 
something important enough that to subtract a name from the list would constitute a 
threat to state power of the first order.46 A clue as to what this might be is provided by 
a story not about the Petrus blacklists but about their political counterpart. It was told 
to me by a wealthy businessman in the private sector. As a person with some 
influence, he had gathered together some high-level military men in hopes of getting 
political charges against an old friend from his hometown dropped. Accustomed to 
dealing with such figures in the context of his business, he thought he might at least be 
able to make sure that his friend was charged with something more minor. But in the 
meeting, when he explained that his friend did not pose a threat and that his offending 
actions had been a mistake, they asked him: "Do you know who [your friend] really 
is?" They then proceeded to ask him questions about his friend's daily activities, which 
he could not answer. Finally, they refused to do anything in the case, saying, "Even if 
you've known [kenal] him for a long time, you can't be certain you really know [tahu] 
who he is." It was an event that clearly made a lasting impression on the man, since he 
told the story to me more than once; moreover, die way he told it made it clear that the 
questions had genuinely caused him to doubt whether he knew his friend or not.
The story shows that what was at stake for the state in its blacklisting was nothing 
less than its power of recognition. The state needed to privilege its own "truth" about 
peoples' identities over competing claims about who people really are. By making the 
lists immutable, state representatives establish a domain where the authority of local 
knowledge, familiarity, and the like are ultimately denied, and where the knowledge 
produced using state surveillance techniques is stated to be "true." In the years before 
Petrus, it might have been possible to use one's own perception of oneself or one's 
neighbors' perceptions of one to influence the way one was identified by the state. 
Certainly, it was possible to maintain a local identity that did not directiy correspond 
to that on the files in the state archive. In this respect, many "criminals" were actually 
regarded as heroes in their local communities. With the Petrus ultimatum, however, 
any other sources of recognition were denied. In the end, the ultimatum asserted, the 
state knows people better than their friends do; better even than they know 
themselves. And although all sorts of other "truths" dictated by the government may 
be subject to localization and corruption, this domain is untouchable.
The Petrus lists were not only immutable, they were also secret. This was 
important because not only because it asserted die exclusivity of state knowledge but 
because it demanded that all citizens ask themselves if they might be "criminals." In 
principle, at least, the situation was not so different from that during the killings of 
"communists" in 1965 and 1966 when people were forced to ask, "Am IPK I or non- 
PKI?"; only now they were forced to ask themselves about their "criminality."47 To
46 Adding names, because of local and personal politics, was probably more acceptable.
47 See the famous article by Pipit Rochijat, "Am I PKI or non-PKI?" in Indonesia 40 (October 1985): 37-56.
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answer this question they had to imagine what the state perceived criminality to be 
and how the state imagined them to be. And since the contents of the lists were not 
made public, the implicit demand was that anyone who had ever been remotely 
suspected by the state, had been in prison, or had committed a crime, should 
voluntarily recognize himself as suspect, even if the person immediately judged 
himself to be innocent in this regard.48
Failing to recognize oneself as the state did could prove fatal: if one's name was on 
the list and one did not submit to heightened surveillance, one could be killed.49 It was 
those people who hid from the state, or even worse, asserted another identity against 
that given to them by the state who would be killed. Lieutenant Colonel Hasbi, the 
Acehnese head of Yogyakarta's garrison, put this in the starkest terms when explaining 
why the shootings were necessary: "Why shoot? Basically we want to work in a 
humane way. But there are those who want to fight back. They want to show off their 
self-identity [identitas dirinya]."50 It was these types, those who refused to submit to 
registration and monitoring, choosing instead to "show off" their own identities, that 
the campaign targeted. The state was thus reserving the ultimate power of recognition 
for its surveillance apparatus: the power over life and death. In theory, at least, 
agreeing to suspect one's own criminality, not just one's politics, was the new 
condition of survival for subjects of the New Order state.
That Petrus identified its "criminal" victims through blacklists and that the 
campaign was designed to demonstrate the overwhelming power of surveillance is 
only one side of the story. The other side is more interesting and difficult to 
understand, and it concerns a quite different impression that developed in many 
quarters regarding how victims were identified. In brief, it was the impression that 
targets for the killings were identified not by hidden lists but by the very visible 
markings on their bodies: tattoos. Certainly many ex-convicts had tattoos, but rumors 
seemed to suggest that having tattoos was sufficient in itself for identifying a criminal, 
and that the mysterious shooters were hunting down anyone with tattoos. Such 
rumors might well have originated in press reports about the discovery of corpses 
which frequently made reference to the victims' tattoos. In any case, the rumors were 
taken seriously enough that many people with tattoos were sufficiently frightened that 
they tried to get rid of their tattoos. During a period of just two weeks in June 1983, 
two hospitals in Bandung recorded sixty-three people who paid to have plastic surgery 
to remove tattoos. Others tried to remove their tattoos themselves. Many inmates at 
Bandung's prison cut their skin off with razor blades or tried to bum their tattoos off 
using caustic soda; others outside the prison used hot irons (nowadays, one frequently 
sees bus conductors and the like with huge scars where their tattoos used to be).51
48 In Yogyakarta, the people Tempo mentioned as being worried about this ultimatum are all members of 
protection rackets and gangs (i.e. calo, petugas keamamn). Tempo, April 16,1983, p. 54.
49 Of course there was no guarantee that those who reported to the authorities would not themselves be 
killed (for a case of this in Yogyakarta, see Tempo, April 16,1983, p. 54). And we will never know how 
many people failed to report because they were too frightened of being killed and how many failed to 
report because they did not see themselves as suspect and thus were not frightened at all.
50 Tempo, May 14,1983, p. 55.
51 Surabaya Post, June 18,1983, p. 1.
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How are we to understand this alternate explanation for how Petrus targets were 
identified? What is the relation between visible tattoos and hidden lists? The relation 
between lists and tattoos as methods for identifying "criminals" and targets for killings 
could be understood to be an unproblematic supplemental relation. This is, at least, the 
gist of the following remarks, which were made toward the end of the Petrus 
campaign in 1983 by a member of Reserse's (Criminal Investigation Division of the 
Police) Identification section in Jakarta:
It is clear that a tattooed person is not [necessarily] a criminal, but as I often 
handle the various types of criminals there are, there has at last arisen an indirect 
impression when I see a tattooed person, such that my inner voice says, "Why it's 
just like a criminal." And the majority of those who often wear tattoos are those 
who really are criminals, which is to say, those who have been in and out of 
prison or who have been blacklisted by the police. And in connection with my 
work, it is clear that tattoos are special signs that have to be noted in people's 
identity files, particularly those who have business with the police. And as a 
matter of fact, historically, before the discovery of a fingerprinting system, tattoos 
were used as a means for identification just like brands made with hot iron.52
This police officer, at the nation's center of criminal identification and registration, 
conveys his belief that tattoos are an "indirect" sign of criminal identity. Someone like 
him, he suggests, who has had countless occasions to look back and forth between the 
lists of convicts and the bodies before him, can pretty safely say that there is a 
correspondence between "criminals" defined by technologies of surveillance and 
bodies with tattoos. In this initial comment, we see one possible way in which tattoos 
might have functioned as a support of the state's claims that its lists and its operations 
were very precise. For as soon as doubts about precision emerged, people could be 
reassured by the indirect evidence that the bodies that were turning up in rivers and 
on the streets were not just any bodies, they were tattooed bodies. For him the 
reassurance came not just through experience but also through a chain of associations 
that allowed him to get from criminals to tattoos via identity cards and back to 
criminals again via fingerprints. This chain of associations went as follows:
crim inal_prisoner_blacklist_identity file_tattoo noted in file_tattoo on 
bodyjbrand on body_fmgerprmt_criminal.
This chain of associations ensures that the gap between the bodies in the world 
"out there" and the identities on file is bridged by an intermediate figure: the 
fingerprint or the tattoo. Yet two things about the policeman's statements suggest that 
he is giving tattoos more significance than the files would. First, he notes at the end of 
the chain of associations that brands and tattoos historically preceded identity files 
(fingerprints, lists, etc.) as a way of signifying the "criminal,'' thereby giving the latter a 
primacy over die former. Second, he says that whenever he sees tattoos his inner voice 
(hati) says, "Why it's just like a criminal." These statements work against what he 
started off saying, which was that tattoos signify criminality only by virtue of a
52 Cited in Arief Sumarwoto, "Latar Belakang Kebiasaan Pelaku Kejahatan Tertentu Memakai Tatto 
Sebagai Salah Satu Ciri Penampilannya" (BA thesis, PTEK, 1984), p. 77. This thesis itself raises the question 
of whether a person wearing a tattoo is necessarily a criminal. It indicates that the association between the 
two—and their life or death implications—did not always sit well with the police.
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statistical correlation. Rather, it turns out that they are "special signs" that in him 
provoke an immediate equation with criminality even when they appear on someone 
not being processed for heightened surveillance. If this is the case, might it not then be 
possible that the lists used in Petrus had a similar re-enforcing effect on what had been 
a prior suspicion of tattoos? Consider the statements of a food seller at a market in 
Jakarta:
It's clear that people with tattoos are criminals [penjahat] Pak, or at least that 
their hearts and actions aren't good. Before, almost every night the small traders 
here were asked for money. It's true it wasn't a lot, Pak, but that money meant a 
lot to us. After a time I came to know the person, but didn't know him really 
well. He turned up only asking for money and then left again. He and his friends 
indeed had tattoos as their distinguishing marks. So that this gave rise to a hunch 
that tattooed people are criminals. What's more when meeting those guys, at 
least I had to be careful, maybe they could be criminals [jangan-jangan orang ini 
penjahat], My hunch was strengthened after I read in the papers that lots of 
tattooed people were shot to death, and they said all of them were criminals. But 
now we here are all calm because those guys who asked for money each night are 
no longer. Maybe they ran away or were shot by someone.53
Here one finds what is probably the most ubiquitous local description of a preman or 
jegger: someone who is known, but to whom one would not admit being close, who 
wears tattoos, and who turns up asking for money. With respect to the tattoos, this 
man's answer shows a movement from (at most) a hunch to something near certainty 
that the tattoos he sees mean criminality (and therefore someone whose death is 
meaningless). One can see in the “jangan-jangan orang ini penjahat" that the recognition 
of whether this person really is criminal, rather than just being "not good," is 
something that has to come from outside (or perhaps, that if it came from inside the 
local sphere the man would already have been killed). The confirmation of his 
suspicion comes from the reports he reads about Petrus.
In sum, while the explicit targets of the Petrus campaign were professional and 
violent criminals, the way in which these criminals were identified was subject to two 
interpretations. One interpretation suggested that identification primarily followed the 
logic of surveillance. In this interpretation, tattoos were merely a supplemental form of 
identification (found on corpses) that could have the effect of containing fears about 
who criminals were. You could see with your own eyes that not just anyone was being 
killed. Another interpretation suggests that the targets of Petrus were not ex-convicts 
and repeat offenders as defined by law and by the surveillance apparatus, but people 
with "special signs" on their bodies. In this interpretation tattoos were already cause 
for suspicion about someone's "criminality" and the state's lists and dead criminals 
acted to confirm what—in retrospect at least—one already knew. The fact that tattoo- 
wearers might be the real targets of Petrus caused Arief Sumarwoto, the policeman 
who wrote the thesis from which the above quotes were taken, some consternation. In 
his thesis he interviews convicts, police, and others, and does statistical analyses to 
determine what percentage of so-called residivis wear tattoos and what percentage of 
tattoo-wearers are residivis. Writing during Petrus, he was clearly bothered by the fact
53 Ibid., p. 75.
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that targeting tattooed bodies might lead to operations like Petrus killing the wrong 
people. Perhaps he was disturbed by the operation and had to write about its injustices 
even if they were defined merely as a technical failure of reference; or perhaps he had a 
tattoo himself.
By suggesting that blacklists were not the only way "criminals" were identified at 
the time of Petrus, I am not hying to argue that Petrus in fact targeted tattoo-wearers 
rather than repeat-offenders. Although it is entirely possible that the above thesis- 
writer's fears (fear shared, as we have seen, by tattoo-wearers) were justified, and that 
people were killed simply for having tattoos, the centralized, bureaucratic form Petrus 
took makes it likely that lists were what actually determined who was killed in most 
instances. Having said this, the centrality given to tattoos as a supposed form of 
identification during the campaign should not be dismissed. While it may not tell us 
the names of who was killed, it provides an important clue as to what people believed 
the campaign was targeting and what the symbolic importance of file campaign was. 
The final two sections of this essay will address these symbolic questions, first, by way 
of a rather extended digression on the different meanings that were attached to tattoos 
at the time of Petrus; and second, by interpreting a few stories told about Petrus and 
Petrus-like killings by participants and observers of the campaign.
Tattoos and Identity
In their descriptions of what led them to wear tattoos in the first place, some of 
Sumarwoto's tattoo-wearing respondents provide a clue as to how these bodily 
inscriptions relate to identity, and why, for some, they may suggest that someone is 
anti-social or even criminal.
When I first became a sailor, sailing many seas, months in others' countries, 
there arose a feeling of longing for my parents, relatives, and friends . . .  so I tried 
to look for something to do just for the fun of it. I noticed among my friends 
those who wore tattoos. I was interested and made some just for fun. And it's 
true that it can chase away the feeling of loneliness. To fill empty time it was 
better than just daydreaming, thinking about impossibilities [yang tidak tidakJ.54
Tattoos, in this context, provide a distraction from desires that cannot be realized by 
focusing one's attention on what is present, thereby filling the emptiness. They give 
shape to a self that is based on a disavowal or a postponement of desires for others 
(family, friends).55 This explanation of tattoos was expressed by several of 
Sumarwoto's respondents, many of whom linked the power of distraction to the pain 
that making the tattoos caused. For the mariner above, tattoos also became the basis for 
a collective memory, shared among those who were on the ship; after the passage
54 Ibid., p. 68.
55 This is not to say that the self is necessarily an "individual" person; it can be a collectivity too, as in the 
following: "I first started wearing tattoos because that is what my friends did. Even though our group 
didn't have a specific name, between us we had customs that we all followed. Because my friends all wore 
tattoos, I too joined them in wearing tattoos." Ibid., p. 70. Here the group shares its desires but in a way 
that does not involve taking on a name. It is not a group that is "looking for a name" (as people often say 
about gangs in Indonesia) by challenging others to duels and by displaying its power.
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above he went on to describe how they exchanged tattoos as "mementos" (kenang- 
kenangan) so that when they got home they would not forget their times together.56
That tattoos are a way of defining a personal or collective self by localizing desires 
and by creating a memory of these desires means that they have an affinity to 
language. In the following statement from a prison inmate, this affinity is exemplified 
by the fact that tattoos can actually become symbols of what one desires.
The first time I came into the prison in 1979 I saw that many of the inmates 
had tattoos with all sorts of different pictures. I was attracted and made some 
myself with the help of some friends who knew how to do it. After I got out of 
prison the first time I realized that these tattoos were not liked by my parents and 
they immediately treated me as a child without value. Because of that I felt there 
was no use anymore in doing good and I made more tattoos on this body of 
mine. To get money I committed more crimes. Finally I often came in and out of 
this prison. With all these tattoos I wanted to be valued by my friends. Although 
my body is small as you can see, in other peoples' eyes I want to be seen as 
terrifying [serem]. I made these tattoos while I was fantasizing [berangan-angan], 
fantasizing about things that couldn't be had at the time. Like the picture of the 
bottle shows that I am a drinker, and the picture of the syringe shows I am a drug 
addict; and you can see all the other tattoos on my arms, legs, chest, and back that 
can't even be counted anymore [they are so many]. Me and my friends in the 
prison already feel that with tattoos on our bodies we are treated as people who 
are in and out of prison. I feel like I've already been stamped as a criminal.57
Here tattoos do not merely localize desire by preventing it from straying beyond 
the attainable; they actually provide a symbolic representation of what these desires 
are. (For this man, the desires are so many they cannot even be counted.) While there is 
undoubtedly some satisfaction in this for the inmate, he also learns that his tattoos 
make him a bit of a pariah in the eyes of his family. They treat him as a "child without 
value," and, it seems, refuse to give him money, thereby forcing him to find money by 
committing more crimes. A good child, presumably, would channel his desire through 
the family and by virtue of this would be repaid by being given money (the parents' 
way of indicating their desire). But the tattoos connote a channeling of desires that 
either stop with his body and its addictions or else lead back to other tattoos worn by 
inmates and gangs. Either way, the language of tattoos is an alien language that is 
anathemetic to the language of kinship,58 and not just kinship but sometimes religion 
too. The head of the Council of Ulama said this to Sumarwoto:
Allah already created the human body with perfection. If making tattoos is 
done by causing the body pain, by wounding it and then inserting ink in the 
scars, then such an action is already wrong, and even more so if this is done 
without a meaningful aim. These things are reminiscent of the time before people
56 In a more Nietzschean vein, one of the inmate respondents claimed that his tattoo was both a memento 
of having been in prison and a reminder (peringatan) for him to do good so as not end up in prison for a 
second time. Ibid., p. 68.
57 Ibid., p. 62.
58 This is obviously not the case when the tattoos are a rite of passage for members of kin groups; but then 
the tattoos are given by the kin community not self-inflicted or gang inflicted.
knew religion. They made tattoos as a tool of worship, or as a reason for bodily 
invulnerability, bodily beauty, and so on . .  . And I hear that people who have 
tattoos can't be made wet by water. So this will disturb the flow of wudlu water 
[water of ritual purification] or can cause the failure of the obligatory bath. It's 
clear that all of this cannot be brought to prayer.59
One presumes that a meaningful aim of bodily harm would include ritualized 
circumcision, which takes place at the hands and under the gaze of selected members 
of the familial, religious, and neighborhood community. But tattoos do not have such 
meaningfulness, since they are done "just for fun"; or even if they do have significance, 
it is a pre-religious, primitive, idolatrous meaningfulness, of which one should be 
suspicious. As was true in the case of the son and his family described above, desires 
are channeled in the wrong way; in this case the head of the Council of Ulama asserts 
that the desires of a tattooed man are channeled to escapism and fetishes instead of to 
prayer and to God.
In sum, there is indeed a sense in which tattoos assert a certain "self-identity." Both 
family authorities and religious authorities can find them to be signs of a lack of 
attention to their respective hierarchies and therefore signs of a misplaced channeling 
of desires. Undoubtedly the assertion of identity through tattoos is all the more 
powerful for being territorial: impressed on the body in a permanent form. Especially 
when they are visible, tattoos serve as a constant reminder to those who see them of an 
improper channeling of desires.
For the state, tattoos were additionally offensive because they seemed to assert an 
identity that could not be traced back to state systems of identification. They were 
precisely not fingerprints or brands, both of which would be stamped using the hands 
of the Police under the watchful eye of the state. Tattoos, rather, were self-inflicted, and 
in prisons at least, were done in hiding from the guards since such practices were 
against regulations.
With Petrus, however, all this changed. By virtue of the lists of criminals, the 
corpses displayed for all to see, and the hundreds of newspaper headlines emblazoned 
with the term "tattooed corpse," tattoos were now both criminalized and indelibly 
associated in people's minds with a form of death that clearly led back to the state. 
They had become brands, or as the inmates called them: stamps (cap). The people who 
found themselves unexpectedly recognized by the eye of eyes had either to accept the 
omnipotence of that eye by submitting to perpetual surveillance or to risk death. Some 
tried a different tactic: to rid themselves of this stamp. The scars they created in the 
process are perhaps the most vivid reminders of what battles over identities entail 
when they are fought on the surfaces of bodies. And although these scars necessarily 
point back to Petrus they do so in a way that does not lead back to death but to 
survival; they indicate someone who was confronted by the state (at least in their 
thoughts) and lived to have their scars tell the story.
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The Power o f Tattoos
While tattoos may assert "self-identity" against kinship, religion, and the state, this 
only scratches the surface of their apparent power. Tattoos are often associated with 
something far greater, like invulnerability. In this regard, they make greatest sense 
when inscribed on the bodies of jawara, or jago, who are known for their coinage and 
fighting skills. Their ability to "horrify," in the words of the inmate respondent above, 
fits well with what the jago and jawara stand for. In the responses given to Sumarwoto, 
this power of tattoos to cause fear is a constant theme. Some indeed craved this power. 
Another inmate:
My attitude has always been that I want to be considered a jagoan, so not long 
after entering into prison I often stood out in various activities, and in tattoos too 
I made as many as possible. With so many tattoos on my body many people pay 
attention to me.60
Here tattoos are part of a larger "attitude of acting like a game cock" (jagoan). They 
make him stand out by making people pay attention to him. Not all people wanted this 
extra attention. One of the respondents actually feared that he would be recognized as 
someone too powerful: "I felt scared [coming into prison with so many tattoos] that I 
would be stamped as the most jagoan."61 Those who did want the power tattoos 
provided them, however, got many and put them in the most visible places. Magically, 
these were not merely seen as attributes of the jago character, however, but as powers 
in their own right. Another inmate:
Those inmates who truly [betul-betul] are not bad/criminal [penjahat] usually 
they only wear a few tattoos and these are in hidden locations. It's like after 
having tattoos there arises a feeling of pride so that it gives off an impression of 
being admired [dikagumi], respected [disegani], and all this gives a push to 
increase one's daring to be determined no matter what [keberanian untuk berbuat 
nekad].62
Having visible tattoos, by giving an impression of being admired, actually pushes 
one to be nekad or determined. It is as if they have a force of their own that creates a 
determination with no bounds. An "unlimited power of expression," as Siegel called it. 
This force comes from the ability of tattoos to capture others' attention, to implicate 
their desires in one's own. The appropriation of such power begins with a process of 
mimicry:
It felt good to have tattoo capital on the body [modal tatoo di badan], there was 
a feeling of being respected, especially by those who just entered the prison. I 
remember the first time I entered prison, if I saw someone with lots of tattoos, in 
my gut I felt fearful too, and even more so if his body was big. After I got out of 
prison for the second time, the capital I had from having been in prison, along
60 Ibid., p. 65.
61 Ibid., p. 66. This respondent also noted that he did not put the tattoos on all at once because there was 
no way he would have been able to stand the pain.
62 Ibid., p. 66.
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with the large number of tattoos on this body of mine, added to my confidence to 
do crimes.63
Seeing himself (and others) fearing and paying attention to tattoos, this inmate wants 
this attention for himself. He mimics them so that he too will have the power he 
desires: the fear and respect of new inmates. The power that he gets from this mimicry 
is a form of capital that gives him the courage to commit more crimes which makes 
more people admire him, which makes him commit more crimes, etc. It is difficult to 
see where this process would end (except, perhaps, in Petrus).
With this man, it is not just that he "desires what everyone desires" (money, a nice 
house, etc.), as Siegel has noted,64 but that he desires what some people do not desire: 
other people's attention. His command over other people's attention, by virtue of his 
fetishized tattoos, is what makes him such a fearsome character and makes them 
respect him. Everyone is looking at him. And insofar as they share his desires too, he 
has charisma. At least he does for as long as inmates are "new" and he can still 
command their attention.
* * *
When the specter of crime appeared in the light of day in the early-1980s, its effect 
was not unlike the effect tattoos had on new inmates. Or at least that is how the media 
and the government portrayed it. The gali-gali seemed nekad in their audacious crimes, 
and through the press everybody was looking at them, admiring and fearing their 
power. Their organization of protection rackets, moreover, seemed to give their power 
currency which they could trade for economic gain. It was as if a hierarchy based on 
tattoos, duels, and territorial authority was taking shape alongside established 
hierarchies based on kinship, office, and rank. This was not merely a question of "self- 
identity" but a question of political power. Of course, it is difficult to imagine that 
these organizations posed any genuine threat to President Suharto's authority. Most of 
the organizations were more like unions of the disenfranchised than mafias. 
Furthermore, even those organizations that had not been formed under the auspices of 
the military were quickly subordinated, through Siskamling, to Police and government 
authority. So why did President Suharto opt for Petrus? It may have been, as Bourchier 
has suggested, that such organizations were tied into a particular fraternity65 within 
the military and that Suharto felt threatened by this alternative power base; or that 
their ties to local authorities threatened to undermine Jakarta's ability to control the 
regions.66 Whatever the immediate political reasons were, we shall see below that 
Petrus did indeed have consequences both for the power of fraternities and for that of 
local communities. In different ways, both were implicated in, and transformed by, the
63 Ibid., p. 63.
64 See Footnote 15 above.
65 My terminology, not his. I use the term "fraternities" to describe such intra-institutional gangs partly 
because they are overwhelming male and partly because—especially within ABRI—they often trace their 
alliances (and rivalries) back to the Academy.
66 Bourchier, "Crime, Law, and State Authority in Indonesia," p. 195
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killings whose overall symbolic effect was to appropriate the power represented by 
"criminals" and embed it within the hierarchy of the state.
Mimicry and Appropriation in the Killings
1. "Criminals" and the State
The tendency of killings during the Petrus campaign to mimic the violence 
attributed to the figure of the gali has been analyzed by James Siegel. According to 
Siegel, this mimicry is especially apparent in the excessive violence (what the 
Indonesian press calls sadis, or sadistic) used to kill the campaign's victims. This use of 
sadistic violence was particularly odd since the express objective of the campaign was 
to rid society once and for all of such excesses. If that was the objective, why did they 
use the methods that they supposedly deplored?
[B]y multiply wounding these gali and accusing the gali of acting in just that 
way, the government, and President Suharto himself, implicitly identified 
themselves with their victims even as they asserted their differences from them. It 
is the imitation of the criminal that is predominant while the assertion of 
difference at this point was mere camouflage.
. . . The government . . . turned gali into corpses intended to indicate not 
merely the danger of anyone daring to act as they were presumed to act, but also 
the unlimited power, inherent not merely in the sadistic quality of these criminals 
but in something beyond it that made it necessary to kill each criminal several 
times. When it is unrestricted, the power of the government is claimed to be 
equal to the power of its adversaries. The force of the government was made 
equivalent to the power attributed to these corpses precisely when the victims 
were murdered multiple times.67
Exactly how this works on a local level is apparent in the following summary of 
what happened during Petrus in a neighborhood in Bandung. It was told to me by a 
young man who was familiar with street culture in that neighborhood.
[Fieldnotes]68 In this area alone there were three killed [during the Petrus 
campaign]. Everyone knows who the preman are because they have their own 
lokasi [place] from which they collect money. If they aren't paid they will stab 
people, bum the store, etc. They will often ask people for their watches. People 
are scared of them and do what they say. To find the preman the military used 
lists of ex-cons (residivis). The usual way of picking them up was with a 
Landrover. If kids saw a green Landrover with yellow on the door enter the 
neighborhood they would nm in fear. The military would then go to the preman's 
house and haul him out into the car (he repeats Landrover as it clearly stood out 
in his mind). It didn't matter if the preman had already stopped doing bad things, 
lived with his family, prayed or whatever. He would still be hauled off. One was
67 Siegel, A New Criminal Type in Jakarta, pp. 108-109.
68 Interpolations written down contemporary with the fieldnotes are in parentheses. Those that have been 
added since by the author are bracketed.
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even a kepala [head of an] RT. When they started turning up dead people talked 
about how they were being killed. Some of them were shot but wouldn't die 
because they had ilmu [magical powers]. If they were shot the bullets would enter 
and they wouldn't be able to get up, but they wouldn't die. The only way to kill 
them was to tie their feet with benang plastik [plastic string] and to tie their neck 
with benang plastik, and then to pull (or tie one end to a tree) so that they were 
held off the ground. It was said that if they touched the ground they wouldn't be 
able to be killed. Kind of like electric wires which must be suspended in mid-air. 
The corpses were then always put in a rice sack and dropped in the river or at the 
outskirts of the city.
This local perspective on Petrus shows the sense of powerlessness in the face of 
agents of death that come from without. We must assume that when he says "everyone 
knows who the preman axe," he is referring to local knowledge, for when he then 
describes the victims that were chosen, it turns out that they might have been good 
and respected members of the community (praying, family, etc.). The lists of the center 
are portrayed as having an inevitable referentiality about them that die local sphere 
can do nothing about.
As soon as this misgiving is out of the way, however, the story turns to how these 
powerful figures were killed. Here, as in other stories we shall see later, the killers are 
said to believe they are confronting someone who is invulnerable. "If they were shot the 
bullets would enter and they wouldn't be able to get up, but they wouldn't die." The victims 
do not die an ordinary death. Rather, their death is one that comes from outside the 
local sphere and achieves its ends by finding the weaknesses in magical 
invulnerability. (In this story, the weak point in a man's invulnerability is that he loses 
his invulnerability when he is lifted out of his territory). Had it been the case that the 
victims simply died ordinary deaths, this fact alone might conceivably become 
grounds for questioning the very existence of their powers of invulnerability and 
charisma. But what the story shows is that in fact the people being killed were 
invulnerable in relation to ordinary death; it is just that the type of death they 
experienced was supernatural. The killers had confronted the magical power of their 
victims with a magic of their own.
It is the continued existence of the supernatural power that makes the story worth 
repeating, for an ordinary death would be of little or no interest so long after the fact. 
But as Siegel has shown in an analysis of stories surrounding the discovery of Petrus 
corpses, the logic of such stories—and therefore, perhaps, the "reason" for making the 
killings themselves into public spectacles—was such that it shifted the focus of interest 
from the preman back to the state.69 Rather than being fascinated by the criminal 
specter, people became fascinated with the power of the killers; rather than tracing the 
source of power back to gangs and other forms of hierarchy, people traced this power 
back to the state. At least this was the case for as long as the corpses of "criminals," like 
the tattoos we saw above, had the effect of powerful signs.
69 Ibid., pp. 120-124.
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2. Territorial Communities and the State
Besides identifying itself with the power attributed to the criminal specter, the state 
also used Petrus to identify itself with the power of territorial communities (or the 
massa, as it were). This somewhat more explicit identification was based on the 
supposed similarity between the Petrus killings and cases of main hakim sendiri (taking 
justice into one's own hands) that preceded Petrus and continued both during and 
after the campaign.70 In cases of main hakim sendiri, members of a community beat and 
often kill either outsiders caught in a criminal act, such as theft or robbery, or people 
from the community who are thought to have done something wrong, like having sex 
out of marriage, committing sorcery, or just being bad characters (i.e. bromocorah, 
jegger, gali, etc.). In many of these cases, the violence also knows no limits, the targets 
are the same as those that were victimized by Petrus, and sometimes the body is even 
disposed of in a manner analogous to how Petrus disposed of many of its victims. 
Certainly cases of main hakim sendiri are reported in a very similar way to how Petrus 
cases were reported. Consider, for example, the following case which occurred during 
Petrus and was reported under the title (in Indonesian): "Recidivist with 'Sweet 
Memory' Tattoo Killed after being Mobbed by Inhabitants of Kampung Krendang."
The brain of a criminal gang in the area of Kampung Krendang named 
Miming (25 yrs), just released from Cipinang prison, was killed as he was 
discovered to be about to commit a crime in the same area last Saturday. The 
suspect, whose body was full of tattoos, was sprawled out bathed in blood in 
front of Gang Janda in East Krendang.71
Main hakim sendiri cases are subject to the sometimes loose notion of catching people in 
the act of committing a crime. Petrus, on the other hand, targeted people at any time in 
any place. Nonetheless, the similarity with Petrus in the reporting of such cases is 
unmistakable. Indeed, Tempo's article on Lieutenant Colonel Hasbi who explained who 
Petrus in Yogykarta was targeting was placed on the same page as a discussion of all 
the recent cases where kampung in Central Java had punished "criminals" to death. The 
reasons analysts gave for these cases were: "the culture of violence among the people," 
"letting emotion speak rather than rationality," and "an excess of solidarity."72 It was 
an identification that did not escape critics of the government's policy. Adnan Buyung 
Nasution, who was then head of the Legal Aid Institute, rhetorically asked: "If the 
people act to main hakim sendiri it's considered anarchy, but if it is the security forces 
that do it?"73
While the story about Petrus in Bandung throws doubt on how far this 
identification was successful, there was a sense in which Petrus could be interpreted as 
the government acting on the behalf of territorial communities, disregarding the law as
70 Regarding highly publicized cases before Petrus and the possibility that Petrus mimicked these cases, 
see footnote 40. For cases after Petrus see, for example, "Two Corpses in a Sack Turn Out to be Recidivists 
Killed by Villagers," Media Indonesia, September 20,1996; "Accused of Stealing Piggy Bank, Village 'Jegger' 
Dead by Mass Punishment," Suara Katya, December 15,1995; "Preman Thrown in River," Suara Karya, 
August 20,1996.
71 Harian Berita Buana, July 25,1983, p. 7.
72 Tempo, May 14,1983, p. 55.
73 Tempo, May 21,1983, p. 12.
32 Joshua Barker
they did, and establishing an "excess of solidarity" with the people. At the same time, 
for its symbolic effect the state's violence depended on being distinguishable from that 
of main hakim sendiri in its territorial sense. Otherwise, one might really have anarchy 
since the violence would appear as a contagion with no clear source and the state 
would not be representing the violence but merely participating in it. This could 
explain why the state, in many cases, found it necessary to claim authorship for the 
killings and why the killings were conducted in a manner that left no doubt as to who 
was behind them.
Insofar as the killings did involve an identification with communal violence, they 
would be comparable to Siskamling's process of kentonganisasi, which as we have seen, 
was meant to bring all the local territories into one giant security system that derived 
its meaning from its supposed source in the state. However, with Petrus, it would be 
not just the community's solidarity that was identified with the state but its violence 
and its power.
3. The Locus within the State: Fraternities and Individuals
Within die state itself, the degree to which the power associated with such killings 
achieved currency, and the tendency to trace the source of that power upward through 
the hierarchy to some higher authority or power, varied. The story below was told by 
Prasetyo, a mid-ranking police officer in Bandung.74 Prasetyo himself was probably the 
most ambitious, and also the most successful, young officer I met in Bandung's police. 
In contrast to the jaded Reserse agents at the precinct, for example, he was radiant in 
his appearance and gave the impression that he was someone who worked hard and 
did things by the book. It was thus quite disturbing to hear him tell tins story in a tone 
of youthful exuberance and pride. It concerns a killing not in the Petrus campaign 
itself, but one of the many that have followed in its wake.75
[Fieldnotes] Prasetyo and I sat on the couch in the division head's office and the 
two of them discussed who I should talk to from the division for my research on 
ilmu. Suddenly Prasetyo remembered a story about a case he had had during one 
of his former postings. When he first started telling the story he was directing it 
to me, but as he went on he increasingly looked expectantly for responses only 
from his boss. The story was about a man who was being held in a lockup by the 
police for having committed some crime (he didn't say what). He was known to 
the locals as an orang pintar [a person with special powers] and indeed it turned 
out that he was able to use an ilmu so that he not only talked the police into 
letting him out of his cell, but even to giving him a gun and letting him go. When 
the police realized (sadar) what had happened they called for help in finding him. 
This is how Prasetyo got involved, as he was part of the team that was sent to
74 Because of fhe nature of Petrus, it is difficult to obtain first-hand accounts of what those who conducted 
the killings thought about it. For the most part, the police I asked denied any knowledge about the 
campaign or made it clear that it was not something that should be discussed. Nonetheless, I was told 
some stories about similar events.
75 The impression I was given was that Petrus-like killings have become a standard Police tool for fighting 
violent crime.
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search for the man. The police who had let him escape told Prasetyo to be careful 
of his ilmu and also said that this man was famous for his huge penis. They 
caught him at the home of one of his many wives. And it was true, his alat [tool] 
was bigger than anything that could be imagined (showing with his hands)
. . .  Almost as an afterthought but conveying a sense that this is what really made 
the story important (not the magic), Prasetyo then looked knowingly at his boss 
and said in a soft voice (so I wouldn't hear) something that sounded like, "It was 
a 486." His boss didn't catch it and asked, "What?" "486. We got an order."76 As 
he said this Prasetyo made a cutting motion at his throat. "Had to be separated 
(dipisahkan)," he said, still speaking softly.
In this story, the potency of the victim is described in overtly phallic terms. Not 
only does he have a huge penis, but he can control language, disarm a policeman, and 
he is the center around which women circulate. An order is received for the man to be 
killed but the killing "has to" be done in a particular way, namely, the man must be 
beheaded. It is common lore in Indonesia that someone with magical powers will not 
actually die unless his head is detached from his body and the two buried separately.77 
In Prasetyo's story, this beheading seems to take on the significance of a castration. It is 
as if the state, for fear of its own loss of potency, is responding not just by killing the 
victim but by emasculating his power.
That Prasetyo took part in this castration could well have been a source of personal 
pride quite apart from the recognition that he received from his superiors. But the way 
Prasetyo told the story suggested that he himself did not lay claim to some superior 
phallic power. His task was not a personal accomplishment but something that "had 
to" be done because that is what the orders were. Insofar as the killing was a feat of 
superior potency, it represented the state's potency, not his. This is not to say that the 
killing did not serve a purpose for him. One could see that he felt a certain pride, but 
this pride was the result of having been entrusted with such an important mission. It 
was as if telling the story was a kind of showing-off about his successes, not in terms of 
the killing itself, but in terms of the recognition it implied he enjoyed from his 
superiors. This showing-off was not for my benefit at all but solely for that of his boss, 
whom he kept looking to for approval as he told the story. This culminated in his use 
of the coded term ("486") for an order to kill, which had the purpose of acting both as a 
euphemism and as a way to establish a solidarity with his boss by highlighting a 
"secret" that they shared (and from which I was excluded). In this regard, the story 
seemed to be part of the currency of "secrets" that helps to constitute fraternal 
hierarchies in institutions like the Army and Police. Interestingly, his boss did not give 
Prasetyo the reward of recognition he sought; rather, he chose not to look directly at 
Prasetyo and to "not understand" what he meant by the code. My impression was that 
this failure to recognize the killing as deserving of recognition was not caused by a 
feeling that Prasetyo had committed an indiscretion in front of a foreign visitor, but 
was actually Prasetyo's boss's way of quietly refusing to use that particular form of 
behavior as any measure of success. Without explicitly opposing such killings, he was 
nonetheless implying that his anak buah was not going to improve his status through
761 could not be sure I had caught the actual code number, but I think it was 486.
7 7 1 use die masculine pronoun here exclusively because virtually all subjects of police discipline in such 
cases are male.
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"accomplishments" in those terms. Other officers, of course, might be far more 
responsive to Prasetyo's desire for recognition; and it is easy to imagine how such 
killings, by virtue of being clandestine and risky ventures, could become an important 
currency in fraternal alliances.
The second story we shall recount also concerns post-Petrus killings but was told 
by Joni, a person quite different from Prasetyo. Joni was from military intelligence, 
rather than from the Police, and moonlighted as a debt collector specializing in 
collections from ABRI (The Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia, Angkatan 
Bersenjata Republik Indonesia) debtors. Talking to Joni, one had the impression that 
the quotidian aspects of life had receded entirely from his awareness. He looked at 
everyone as if they were strangers, even his wife and kid. He lived in fear and in an 
unsettling but not overt way he imparted fear to those he met.
[Fieldnotes] Joni is the son of an Indonesian Brigadier General and a Dutch 
woman. His elder brother is a Major heading up East Surabaya's military police. 
Joni was bom in 1968. When he was young his father used to insist that he arrive 
home right on time. If he was even a few minutes late he had to do pushups. His 
father was said to have some powerful ilmu as his mother told of how when he 
was fighting against the Dutch he could run across water. When his father died 
some years ago his teacher in ilmu started taking care of Joni. Joni and the rest of 
his family are from Surabaya but the teacher was from Banten. Now his mother 
lives in Bandung.
Joni went to Akabri [Academy of the Armed Forces of Indonesia, Akademi 
Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia] and from there went to East Timor. At 
Akabri they were given really tough training, like making their way through 
ditches filled with shit. He graduated from Akabri in 1987 and probably soon 
after went to Timor, later returning for a second tour of duty. In Timor he held 
the komando (i.e. was commander) of a battalion that wore long hair and tore its 
signs of identification from its uniforms because the Timorese would kill them if 
they knew what unit they were from. He twice led battalions into ambushes, with 
most of the men being killed. In one of these cases the Timorese were waiting up 
in trees at night and shot them with bows and arrows. Some got it through the 
head, some through the throat. Joni then told his men to be quiet and not to 
move. They waited until they could see where the attackers were and then shot 
them out of the trees with their AK's. Joni got the leader of these men who was 
the kepala suku [tribal chief] and cut off his head. He still has a photo of himself 
holding the man's head. He says that the Timorese have powerful ilmu and that 
they can even shoot through bullet-proof helmets. Joni was given a tiny A1 Quran 
by his father's guru. Because he has a Dutch mother he never really believed in it. 
But he brought it to Timor anyway. There were others who said that when he 
slept they could see two tigers watching over him. He never saw them but once 
he pretended to be asleep and he could smell them.
When he returned to Surabaya he was given a komando and he and his 
underlings did some tough things like swimming to Madura from East Java. This 
is an area known for sharks so he was pretty worried. Having returned from 
Timor he says he knew nothing about ampun [mercy], feeling like he was still 
back in Timor (which he attributed to "trauma"). Thus, for example, one night he
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was walking along and a man came up behind him and held a knife to his throat 
saying that if he moved he would kill him. He wanted money. But he didn't 
make Joni put his hands up so Joni was able to grab his gun. He then held the 
gun to the man's head and told him that if he moved he would be shot. Joni then 
tortured him, beating him and then shooting his kneecap. He always had extra 
bullets so he could refill his gun, pretending none had been fired.
While in Surabaya he also got at least one special order to kill a dangerous 
criminal. One of these was a man of whom the police were afraid because he was 
kebal [invulnerable] to being shot. Joni's order was to shoot him and put him in a 
rice bag (dikarungin). The man had tattoos all over. When he did it Joni still had 
long hair and a beard because he had just come back from Timor. He was 
wearing a long grey jacket. His relatives had told him to make sure to say a 
prayer before shooting so that the bullet would go through (menembus). Before 
going he made sure to mengisi [fill] the bullet by saying the ayatkorsi [a prayer to 
exorcise spirits]. The man was in a market when Joni ran up and shot him in the 
head saying "wismillah. . .  ". And the bullet went through. Everyone around ran 
away and he put the mayat [corpse] in a bag and dumped it.
He is glad not to be in Surabaya now because during the trial of that case the 
family of the dead man said, "Oh, this is the man who killed my brother. No 
matter where he goes in the world we will find him and kill him, and if not us 
then our children will do it." And indeed a younger brother did appear once and 
stabbed him in the stomach, and Joni then pulled out his gun and shot him. If he 
hadn't had been helped by some bystanders right away he probably would have 
died. (He lifts his shirt and shows the scar). [...]
Recently Joni got an order here in Bandung to kill a penjahat kelas kakap [big- 
fish criminal] named Rudi. Supposedly Rudi has robbed a bank in Bogor and got 
away with it, and has raped. He is now in Bandung. The other people in Joni's 
team are all bapak-bapak [older men] who are in their forties, so they don't want to 
do it. They passed it on to Joni. Joni is not sure he wants to do it though because 
he now has a wife and kid. It's been a week since the order came down and he 
hasn't done anything yet but he probably will have to soon. He is worried that 
there will be a balas dendam [revenge] and his family will get it. This happened to 
his elder brother after he had killed a criminal. They came and killed his family, 
chopping off his wife's legs. Now his brother is known for his toughness. Every 
criminal who is caught in the area he controls leaves with his legs broken or 
maimed.
Even more than Prasetyo's account, Joni's stories emphasize the incredible power 
of his adversaries, be they independence fighters in East Timor or preman in Surabaya. 
Attributed to all of them is a magical power that makes doing battle with them an 
almost supernatural affair. In this case, however, Joni is quite clearly using the power 
of his adversaries to demonstrate his own power: the ilmu passed down from his fattier 
that allows him to sleep safely in East Timor and to kill someone in Surabaya who had, 
until then, been considered invulnerable. Unlike Prasetyo, the authority to which he 
lays claim has nothing to do with the recognition he receives from his superior
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officers.78 (In fact, he was ambivalent about the military hierarchy since he had been 
court-martialled for striking a superior and thus had lost prospects for much 
advancement). It has to do, rather, with his survival and killing skills, and the ilmu he 
inherited from his father. It is especially the latter—his use of a dukun (shaman), his 
being guarded by tigers, his "filling" of the bullet, and his reciting of the ayatkorsi—that 
gives him power over death. It is also this that distinguishes him from others in the 
state (his comrades in East Timor or the Police in Surabaya) who do not have such 
power.
In stun, tiie appropriated phallic or magical power of preman is not always given an 
undifferentiated locus in the "government" or the "state". Rather, individuals and 
fraternities within the state, through their actions and stories, may seek to control the 
circulation of this power for themselves.
4. The Threat of Revenge
Joni's story also shows, however, that there is an inherent danger in the mimicry of 
"criminals," for it can lead to a cycle of revenge. The phenomenon of revenge, in which 
"criminals," kin groups, or territorial communities seek to recuperate the power they 
lose when the state—or persons or fraternities within it—kill, beat, or imprison people, 
is a common one in post-Petrus Indonesia. It is evident, for example, in the numerous 
cases in which communities reassert their own power to main hakim sertdiri against the 
power of the Police in cases of sorcery, theft, sex outside of marriage, and extortion. In 
cases such as these the Police usually do not risk charging suspects for fear that they 
themselves will become objects of the community's wrath. When the Police do 
overstep this line, the usual response is not actual killing but the spectacular 
destruction of Police precincts by crowds of upset people. The most explosive of these 
cases occur when the Police are said to main hakim sendiri against someone who is 
respected locally.79 However, even in these cases, it is extremely rare that the 
communities will actually revenge the crime directly and proportionally, and so 
genuinely reassert their power over death. Rather, they will restrict their violence to 
property so as not to challenge state authority directly. Nonetheless their actions are a
78 As Joni talked about his orders, I got the sense that he did not really know where exactly they came 
from, only that he must obey them. And at no time during out discussions did he mention any of the 
ideological reasons behind die war in East Timor or the operations against preman. For him the "reasons" 
for these wars never even entered the picture; he was concerned merely with the power and danger 
associated with his own role in them.
79 This might trigger full-scale riots, as happened in Tasikmalaya in 19%. In that case, according to one of 
the rumors circulating right after it occurred, a police commander had sent his son to a pesantrhn (Islamic 
boarding school) for disciplining as he had been caught stealing. At the pesantren he was caught stealing 
again and received punishment from the pesantren head. The boy was angry and reported to his father that 
he had been tortured. Upon hearing this the commander sent some his artak buah to bring in those who 
were said to have done the beating and revenged the beating by beating them (some rumors said to 
death). Word of this got out to pesantrtn students and in the riot that ensued almost all the Police stations 
in the city, as well as shops, churches, etc. were burned and destroyed.
Other interpretations of the same event suggested that the riot was in fact instigated so as to make it 
look like die people were angry with the Police. These analyses claim that a faction in the Army was the 
inciter, implying that the real source of such violence is fraternities rather than the masses.
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powerful reminder to representatives of the state that there are other sources of power 
that count.
In other cases, the revenge against the government is more direct but remains in 
the realm of fantasy. As one man in Bandung's prison who claimed to be doing time 
for fraud explained:
[Fieldnotes] All you have to do is a bit of arithmetic. In the time of the PKI, how 
many people were killed? A million? Now, if all those people had children, how 
many people is that? Two million? Remember, all those kids grew up without 
their parents and cannot get jobs because they are stamped PKI. Now add the 
hundred thousand [sic] people killed during Petrus. All their kids grew up 
without their fathers and they know who it was who killed diem. They ask: why 
don't I have a father? And they blame the government. That's why the 
government here is so scared. They know that there are so many millions of 
people who want to seek revenge.
The man who expressed this fantasy of revenge was an unusual character. He could 
perform magic to make money disappear and told fascinating stories about his 
criminal history that stretched the limits of credibility without ever breaking them. 
Among other things, he claimed to have been a counterfeiter, a dukun, and a fraud 
artist. But one thing about him was clear: when he spoke, people listened. Whereas the 
prison's canteen was usually filled with multiple conversations, when he was there 
everyone else fell silent. And when he spoke about the inevitability of revenge, one 
almost started to believe it. The revenge he had in mind was not the personal or local 
forms feared by Joni and local police precincts, however. It was collective, implicating 
not just preman but all those who had been criminalized by the New Order's repressive 
regime.
* * *
In sum, the process of mimicry that was evident among inmates who desired the 
power associated with tattoos was also evident in Petrus and its aftermath. As Siegel 
has shown, the overall function of this mimicry was to identify the state with the 
power that criminality represented: magical power, the power of unlimited expression, 
excessive violence. Through this identification, Petrus insured that anyone who took 
an interest in such power would come to associate it with the state. We have also 
suggested that "criminality" might not have been the only figure that was being 
mimicked; the actions of the state could also have been identified with—or perhaps 
even modeled upon—the most potent moment in the expression of collective territorial 
power: main hakim sendiri. With regards to the consequences of these forms of mimicry 
we have made two observations. First, the power that is appropriated to the state may 
itself be subject to claims by individuals, or function as a currency within fraternities, 
so that it is not always the state as such that becomes the new locus for this power. 
Second, both "criminals" and territorial communities, through their threats and 
fantasies of revenge, offer reminders that they are still forces to be reckoned with. 
While we will not investigate the implications of these possibilities here, it is important 
to keep diem in mind.
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Tattoos And Preman After Deterritorialization
When the power attributed to tattoos and preman is appropriated by the state, it 
creates a whole new type of preman and even a new type of tattoo. Consider the 
following newspaper story:
The Malang court last Tuesday sentenced S (29 yrs) to seven months in prison 
for having committed fraud by claiming to be a commander of Pomal [Navy 
Military Police] working as a petrus (mysterious murderer) and extorting 
[money] from a person who sells games . . .  Evidence included a TNI-AL [Navy] 
membership card, a Kodam 0802 [Army] membership card, and a number of 
threatening letters and lists of names of people who were going to be petrus-ed
On Friday October 28 [the victim] was visited by S, an unknown man who 
claimed to be the commander of Pomal and working as an agent of Petrus. S 
showed him a list of names who he was going to Petrus, among them two of the 
victim's younger brothers.
Because he was worried and afraid, the victim did what S asked and gave 
him Rp.17,000. On Tuesday November 1 the victim received a letter from S the 
contents of which demanded Rp.35,000 in order to have the names of his two 
younger brothers erased from the list of people who were going to be petrus-ed.
[After that the victim reported it to the police who arrested S].80
In this story an extortionist claims power for intimidation not by showing tattoos 
but by showing lists and identity cards. He mimics Petrus mimicking "criminals" like 
himself. The difference, of course, is that the identity cards and lists this man has 
derive their power not from a territorial inscription but from state language and its 
power over death. This language has a source in the state and a claim to referentiality. 
The importance of this fact became apparent in the man's trial, when the judges asked 
him about the Army identity card and he told them he found it on the street. Knowing 
that there was no such thing as a Kodam with a four-digit number "0802" in the world 
"out there," and therefore that the man's identity cards were counterfeit and his claims 
false, the judges were able to laugh, secure in their own possession of the truth.81
Not all such identity cards and lists are so easily dismissed, however. Certainly in 
the mid-1990s, in the press and on the streets one was always hearing about surat sakti 
(magically powerful letters) that would clear a business project through any 
bureaucratic office, people who were kebal hukum (invulnerable to law), and those 
criminals who were not white-collar criminals but rather preman berdasi (former street 
preman impersonating civil servants). Ordinary people, moreover, were always going 
out of their way to show anyone who was interested their own special signs, which, 
without exception, traced their power back either to an institution like the military or 
to a fraternity. Stickers on cars that said Kopassus (the Special Forces) or Pom (Military 
Police), name cards from important officials, identity cards and paraphernalia from the 
Harley Davidson club (which was known to be headed by a General and fraternity
80 Surabaya Post, January 25,1984, p. 5.
81 Other cases of these Petrus impostors: "Wanita Pemeras yang Mengaku Penembak Misterius 
Ditangkap" Surabaya Post, January 14,1984, p. 3. "Memeras dengan Dalih ‘Petrus',"Surabaya Post, June 2, 
1984.
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leader) were all examples of the new type of tattoos. They could all be used to 
intimidate villagers, avoid fines and exactions if one was stopped by the traffic police, 
and simply to impress one's friends. Periodically the institutions would try and exert 
their control over the circulation in order to distinguish the "originals" from the "false" 
ones; for example, by conducting operations to remove ABRI stickers from cars driven 
by people who could not produce an ABRI membership card. But while the circulation 
of these special signs or tokens might extend beyond the particular groups of people 
who could legitimately hold them, this was ultimately a minor point. The important 
thing was that they derived their invulnerability and magical power from their 
connection to the state's institutions and fraternities rather than their connection to 
some other source of power (like territorial gangs, illegal political parties, outlawed 
religious sects, etc.). In this respect, Petrus might be called a watershed moment as it 
marked the point at which territorial power became deterritorialized from the figure of 
the jawara and reterritorialized within the state and its fraternities. That is, it marked 
the point at which the power that at one time would have been associated with tattoos 
became subject to a whole new set of disciplines that were rooted in surveillance and 
fraternities rather than in bodies and localities.
Local Security and the State After Petrus and Siskamling
Taken together, Petrus and Siskamling changed the face of local security. On a 
strictly institutional and demographic level, this change was evident in the explosion 
of satpam and hansip. With preman killed or intimidated, businesses, bus terminals, 
markets, malls, and so on all came to hire satpam; and many neighborhoods hired 
hansip. By the end of 1995, there were about 200,000 satpam across Indonesia, making 
them more numerous than die Police.82 That every satpam and hansip had a particular 
overseer among the Police, and that the Police co-ordinated with the guards 
themselves, not just their bosses, meant that this expansion of satpam provided a 
relatively powerful means for disciplining local security practices.83 In this respect, 
Siskamling provided for the extension of Police surveillance into the local sphere. 
Much of the time, this additional surveillance also acted as the premise for a far greater 
involvement of the Police in local protection rackets than had previously been possible 
when such rackets were either under the control of gangs, heads of RT/RW , or the 
Army.84 While there is always a tendency for the type of petty criminals that Petrus 
targeted to return, the Police deal with this by launching operations much like the ones 
that preceded Petrus. In these operations, everyone on the streets is rounded up and 
fingerprinted, some are charged, some are "developed" by the Police, and some are
82 Media Indonesia, December 27,1995. This was approximately one satpam per nine hundred people, 
while the ratio of police to inhabitants was one officer per 1,200 inhabitants. In urban areas the ratio was 
far greater. According to Police data, in 1996 in Bandung, there was about one satpam or hansip for every 
two hundred inhabitants and only one police officer per 733 inhabitants. The total number of satpam in 
1996 was 6,345, up from 336 in 1984 and none before 1980.
83 At the same time, Bimmas provided a rubric for expanded Police oversight not just of security guards 
but of youth groups, pesantrin, ojik (motorcycle taxis) drivers, and "informal" local leaders. Many of these 
received training and coordination from the Police and became what the Police referred to as their 
"extended arm s" (perpanjangan tangan).
84 Some gangs continued to operate with bekking (backing) from fraternities in the Army or the Police.
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sent off to pesantrtn (Islamic boarding schools) or foundations for reform.85 In this way 
the Police maintain their local domination (except in relation to gangs with bekking86 
from the Army) despite their extremely low numbers. None of this would have been 
possible without Petrus.
Petrus, however, was about far more than just demographic and institutional 
changes; it was about the deterritorialization of the power associated with "criminals," 
jago, and territorial communities, and its reterritorialization within the state. Such 
deterritorialization proceeded by means of mimicry coupled with surveillance. 
Mimicry allowed the state to identify itself with the said power, releasing it from its 
locus in "crim inals," jago, and territorial communities. Surveillance, through its 
ultimatum forcing "criminals" to recognize themselves as the state would or die, and 
through its control over what "true" identities are, insured that the circulation of this 
power would lead back to one source: the state. The process was the same as that used 
for kentonganisasi: a copy of the kentongan in villages around the country is created at 
the center, one that is bigger than any of the rest, and then all the other kentongan are 
counted and subjected to regulations that oblige them to derive their significance from 
the one at the center. The difference, however, was that nobody was killed in the 
process of kentonganisasi, and kentongan were not themselves associated with the type 
of power that the specter of crime evoked, so kentonganisasi did not attract the same 
attention as Petrus. With Petrus, the people who were killed were invested with a 
"suprabiological force" that should resist death (their tattoos, invulnerability, force of 
expression that knows no bounds); and yet, it seemed, the state could even control 
this.87
Prologue: Post-Suharto Indonesia: Ninjas and Sorcerers
In the immediate aftermath of Suharto's fall, the Muslim (especially Nahdlatul 
Ulama) population of Java has been terrorized by a mysterious killing campaign 
directed against so-called dukun santet (sorcerers). These killings, which began in 
Banyuwangi and have since spread throughout Java, bear more than a passing 
resemblance to Petrus. As with Petrus, they seemed to begin as "local" killings 
(sorcerers being even more feared and hated locally than preman) but have since been 
imitated by highly organized squads of masked men using walky-talkies, hand- 
signals, and maps. These squads reportedly select their victims from lists of dukun
85 Those that are sent-off for outside reform are sent to collaborating pesantrhn or to ex-convict 
organizations that escaped Petrus through connections to the right powers in Jakarta. These latter groups, 
sometimes trained by the military, are useful for political purposes like instigating riots since their 
members can always be threatened with being killed or imprisoned if they do not cooperate. For example, 
one such group was used in the violent take-over of the PDI (Indonesian Democratic Party) headquarters 
in July 19%.
86 Bekking means that a gang is "backed" by people in die military. Such bekking protects the gang from the 
law and allows the military to be involved in protection rackets without appearing to be so.
8 7 1 borrow the phrase "suprabiological force" from a paper by James T. Siegel. See Siegel, "A  New 
Criminal Type in Jakarta: Counter Revolution Today." Paper presented at the conference, Crime and 
Punishment: Criminality in Southeast Asia, sponsored by the Center for Asian Studies. Amsterdam,
March 20-22,1997.
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santet prepared by local government officials.88 The killers themselves are known as 
ninja (a term that first gained currency in East Timor where it meant groups of 
unidentified, masked-men who burst into houses to kidnap, threaten, or murder 
locals)89 and are widely believed to be members of the military, or at least military- 
trained.90 As with the Petrus killings, the victims of these new mysterious killings are 
brutally murdered, their corpses mutilated and left on display in public places (the 
corpses are stabbed dozens of times, often chopped up, and then hung in sacks near 
mosques). As I write this, almost two hundred such killings have been recorded.91
Despite the similarities between the Petrus and dukun santet killings, however, the 
differences between the two cases are also instructive. Besides the obvious fact that the 
population being terrorized consists mainly of religious preachers (guru ngaji) rather 
than ex-convicts, tattoo-wearers, and gangs, what stands out about the Banyuwangi 
campaign is the widespread failure of the killings to attract people's support. On the 
contrary, as soon as the killings became an issue in the press, the public response was 
to identify with the victims and to fear the ninjas (whom National Police Chief, 
Lieutenant General Roesmanhadi, then tried to claim were PKI, a claim that was 
greeted in most quarters by derision).92 This fear—combined with suspicions that 
elements in the military are masterminding the affair—has translated into an extremely 
militant use of the ronda and other local security systems:93 frequencies and densities of 
patrols have been stepped-up, cars (especially those with Jakarta plates) are stopped by 
local guards as they enter villages and their occupants asked to produce identity 
papers, strangers lurking around pesantrin  or asking questions about people's 
whereabouts are apprehended and questioned.94 Ironically, in many areas this 
strengthening of the ronda has had the effect of weakening rather than strengthening 
Siskamling; for rather than acting on behalf of the Police, local guards actually main 
hakim sendiri, sometimes even mobilizing enough people to reclaim for "mass 
punishment" ninjas that had already been turned over to the Police.95 In other words, a 
gap has opened up between the logic of local security practices and the logic of 
centralized policing. As Central Java's Police Chief, Major General Nurfaizi, 
complained after ronda guards killed a suspected ninja:
88 On how the killings in Banyuwangi were organized and how they differ from local killings of dukun 
santet, see Tempo, October 20-26,1998, pp. 18-21.
89 Benedict Anderson, personal communication.
90 On the claim that the ninjas include deserters from Kopassus and their trainees, see Detak 17 (November 
3,1998).
91 Jakarta Post, November 6,1998.
92 Jakarta Post, November 5,1998.
93 In addition to strengthening its guard watches, at least one pesantrtn reportedly mobilized one 
thousand ghosts to defend against the threat of ninja. Pikiran Rakyat, October 29,1998, p. 4.
94 For example, see Pikiran Rakyat, November 1,1998, pp. 1 ,6 ; Pikiran Rakyat, November 8,1998, pp. 1 ,8 ; 
Pikiran Rakyat, November 12,1998, p. 4.
95 In Central Java alone, at least thirty-nine people suspected of being ninjas have been killed in mob 
violence. The victims are often hung, decapitated, chopped-up, and then burned. Many have later been 
found to people with histories of mental illnesses or passers-by. See Jakarta Post, November 11,1998. In 
Kuningan, West Java, more than seven hundred people attacked a police station where it was thought four 
ninjas were being held. Pikiran Rakyat, November 1,1998, p. 8.
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Their security system was exaggerated and uncontrollable. They do not even 
have a proper plan. People should also have to obey the existing laws without 
conducting such mob rule.96
The logic of these killings, which targets strangers and unidentifiable people rather 
than people whose names are on lists, is outside of state control. It is this lack of control 
that die police chief finds disturbing. And with good reason: on at least one occasion 
the so-called ninjas killed by local people were in fact uniformed police officers (a case 
that resulted in revenge killings by the Police).97
In sum, if we return to the comparison to Petrus, the main difference is that the 
Banyuwangi case shows no clear signs of having established a symbolic recuperation. 
Rather, what one finds is all sorts of competing claims as to what the real source of fear 
is: Is it dukun santet that one should be afraid of? Or the PKI? Or ninja? Or the Police? 
Or perhaps the ronda guards with their road blocks and their fear of strangers? 
Depending on the answer, one should seek security in either the authority of the ninja, 
the Army, the ronda, ghosts, or perhaps even a particular political party. All these 
possibilities, most of which were already latent in Petrus, are now out in die open for 
everyone to see. In the end, if a symbolic recuperation is possible for the dukun santet 
killings, it will undoubtedly take the least surprising and most reassuring of the 
possible answers to those questions: that the ultimate source of this new killing 
campaign—and thus the source of fear—is Suharto himself.98 Given the brutality of the 
violence on all sides, however, one wonders if such a recuperation is even possible.
96 Jakarta Post, November 11,1998.
97 Pikirati Rakyat, November 2,1998, pp. 1,11; Jakarta Post, November 6,1998, p. 1.
98 On Amien Rais's claim that Suharto is behind the killings, see Jakarta Post, November 6,1998, p. 1.
